As the wave of reopening orders sweeps across the country, businesses see a light at the end of the tunnel. That light, however, in many instances is still yellow, and may be so for some time to come. Serious restrictions continue to hamper the habitual functioning of America’s businesses, customers have dwindling cash to pay for goods, supplies are restricted or cut, and social distancing practices and protocols reduce productivity. Companies, therefore, continue to take a closer look at their contracts to determine their rights, including whether force majeure and other provisions may still be invoked.

This article is set forth in three parts. First, it describes general considerations in deciding whether and how to invoke force majeure, encouraging contracting parties to take a holistic view of the entire contractual relationship. Second, the article addresses best practices in drafting force majeure notices, including general points to consider, what form a notice should take, and what to include in the notice. This portion of the article includes a draft template that can be tailored to the specific business and legal context. Third, this article describes general notices, a tool often used in construction contracts, as an alternative to specifically addressing force majeure. This section recognizes that there are often instances in which other contractual remedies are more attractive than force majeure.

General Considerations

When drafting a notice related to a force majeure event, it is important to keep in mind a few general themes, including the objectives, contract terms, an understanding of the force majeure event, the business relationship, and, as always, the potential for litigation.

  • Objectives. It is imperative to determine the objective that the force majeure notice will serve. What are you trying to accomplish with the force majeure notice? Is an extension of time sought? Is the recovery of prolongation costs in addition to schedule relief needed? While many have knee-jerk reactions to serve a notice under the contractual force majeure provision the instant an unforeseen event impacting performance occurs, it is critical to make sure the objective of the notice is clear before sending. Keep in mind that typical force majeure provisions may only offer an extension of time to perform. There may be, however, certain circumstances in which invoking force majeure is not the best route to accomplish the objective, particularly when other contractual remedies afford more practical or attractive solutions to meet your objectives.
  • Contract terms. Force majeure notices are contractually driven. The form and contents of the notice are governed by the force majeure provision in the contract. However, after establishing objectives, what if the remedies available in the force majeure provision do not match those objectives? Does the contract contain other clauses that provide a better remedy more in line with your objectives? Knowing all of the nuances of the contract becomes critical to determining your course of action. It is also crucial to consider the contractual options of your contract opponent. Will you trigger a reason to terminate or withhold payment? Will you trigger a claim of anticipatory breach? Be familiar with all contractual terms before drafting any force majeure notice.
  • Understand the impacts caused by the force majeure event. This may seem obvious, but it is necessary to consider the possible scenarios occurring at the beginning of the force majeure event, and afterwards as well. There have been numerous federal and state shutdown and stay-at-home orders issued, and now we are beginning to see reopening orders being implemented. As the shutdown and stay-at-home orders are lifted, there will be a “ramp up” period in which businesses will open, but not be operating at full capacity. Will this ramp-up period, when an emergency declaration is no longer in place, still impact one’s ability to perform under the contract? Moreover, what impact will social distancing have on your business for the weeks or months after the technical force majeure event ends? Offices may operate at half-staff, stores may limit the number of guests allowed at a time, and factories may limit the number of staff at the facility. Considering all of the possible impacts of the force majeure event will be key in determining what to include in a notice.
  • The business relationship. It is always important to strictly abide by contractual notice requirements. However, the strength of your business relationship can impact how your notice is received. A longstanding business partner may accept a simple contract-compliant notice that generally explains the delays and increased costs due to the force majeure event, while other more litigious business partners may require a more detailed explanation. There may be other outside laws, regulations or considerations that impact the force majeure notice, including whether there are administrative notice requirements, whether the parties conduct other business together, and whether the force majeure event has impacted that business as well. While it is important to understand the contract between the parties in drafting a force majeure notice, it is just as important to have a complete understanding of the business relationship and the people involved.
  • The potential for litigation. As always, keep in mind that there could be litigation resulting from the force majeure event. Accordingly, the notice should be drafted as if giving notice for any other legal purpose, with a long-term view in mind. Be flexible with the notice, and avoid limiting rights and remedies to prevent hamstringing legal positions down the road. Remember, courts have held that “[t]he failure to give proper notice is fatal to a defense based upon a force majeure clause requiring notice.” Sabine Corp. v. ONG Western, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1168-69 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (dismissing defendant’s force majeure affirmative defense for failure to provide sufficient and proper notice of invoking force majeure).

With that background, here are some best practices when drafting force majeure notices.

Drafting Force Majeure Notices

Form and Service of Notice

When issuing either a force majeure notice or more general notice of delay, there are a few practical concepts to keep in mind regarding what form the notice should take. These three tips will ensure your notice is proper and serves its intended purpose.

  • Comply with the contract terms. The general form of the notice will be guided by the terms of the contractual force majeure provision. This will include the means of communicating the notice, the way in which the notice is to be served, and the time in which the notice must be served. Parties typically must strictly adhere to the requirements set forth in notice provisions to be effective.
  • If impossible, then substantially comply. There may be instances, however, when strict compliance is impossible. For example, if personal service is required, governmental restrictions limiting business operation may prevent a party from providing personal service within the time period allotted. Under these circumstances, substantial compliance may excuse failure to achieve literal compliance with the contract terms. Courts have held that a reasonable effort to provide notice as soon as possible may constitute valid notice, even if it is not in strict compliance with the contractual terms. See Toyomenka Pac. Petroleum, Inc. v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 771 F. Supp. 63, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting summary judgment and holding that six-day delay in providing notice did not prevent defendant from force majeure defense because defendant made reasonable effort to give notice as soon as possible).
  • Keep and maintain documentation of all notice activities. Where strict compliance is impossible to achieve, keep careful records of all attempts to serve and provide notice. Complete records will be critical to combat later arguments that a notice was ineffective because it was not served in compliance with the contract.

Substance of a Force Majeure Notice

After identifying your objectives, understanding the event, analyzing the business relationship, and reviewing your contract, you decide that invoking force majeure is the best option. Each of the below points should be included in your force majeure notice. Including these points should ensure your force majeure notice will constitute valid notice under your contract.

  • Identify the force majeure event. Regardless of how obvious or apparent the force majeure event may be, the force majeure event must be specifically identified in the notice. It is common for contractual force majeure provisions to specifically reference events like government acts, pandemics, epidemics or health emergencies. Some force majeure provisions are more general, and may only reference events like “acts of God.” If the event does not fall squarely within an enumerated event covered by the force majeure clause, mirror the language of the force majeure clause when explaining the event. If intent on invoking the force majeure clause, cite specifically to the section and language of the force majeure provision in the contract when detailing the event. Keep in mind, however, you should do this only if you have gone through the contract and concluded that invoking force majeure is the best option. If other, better remedies are available in the contract, then including reference to the specific force majeure section may limit your potential rights and remedies during a litigation. Thus, you should include a citation to the specific force majeure clause only if force majeure is the desired course and you do not plan to ever seek additional forms of relief. Otherwise, as discussed further below, your notice should not include reference to the force majeure provision to avoid limiting future rights.
  • Explain how the force majeure event impacts performance. The notice should provide an explanation of how the force majeure event is preventing performance of contractual obligations and how long it is expected to impact performance. Reference sections in the contract that are specifically impacted, such as clauses detailing work, deliverables or services to be provided. Characterize and quantify the loss of time, ability or money suffered as a result of the force majeure event. Include attempts taken to mitigate, and, if possible, consider providing supporting documentation. Keep in mind, however, that if there is an expected insurance or government investigation into the force majeure event, providing documentation such as photos should only be done if absolutely necessary.
  • Identify the relief the force majeure notice seeks. Here is where knowing your contract and having clear goals come into play. Are you seeking an extension of time to perform? Are you seeking termination of the contract? While the available remedies may be contract-dependent, the notice should include the relief sought.
  • Include adequate assurances. In order to avoid any claims for anticipatory breach, it may be necessary to include adequate assurances of performance once the force majeure event subsides. Include how and when performance will be fulfilled once possible. This is especially important if only a suspension of performance is sought, and not termination of the contract. Note that updates will be given if circumstances change, and keep the possibility of continuing the contractual relationship if feasible. If there are no alternatives and termination is sought, notify and memorialize any attempts made to perform, and be clear in noting the force majeure event’s impact on the ability to perform.
  • Do not limit rights. Circumstances change. Litigation may arise. The notice may be an exhibit to a pleading. Be sure to reserve all rights and remedies, both contractually and at law, in the notice. In addition, consider whether you might be able to rely on the common law doctrines of impossibility, impracticability or frustration of purpose, and make reference to each in your notice to ensure they are not waived.
  • Supplement as more information becomes available. Keep the lines of communication open. Advise that regular updates will be given. Show good faith in the attempts to perform and mitigate damages. This will go a long way for the business relationship and in potential litigation, especially during times of uncertainty.

Force Majeure Notice Template

To go along with the best practices, a template force majeure notice that can be used to invoke a force majeure provision is available here. It is consistent with the guidance and best practices above. It should be tailored depending on the terms of the contract, the relationship of the parties, the type of force majeure event, and the ultimate goals in issuing a force majeure notice. Keep in mind, however, that while the template serves as a guiding framework, the notice must ultimately be consistent with the terms of the contractual requirements and the law of the relevant jurisdiction.

General Notice Instead of Force Majeure Notice

In certain circumstances, particularly in construction contracts, the remedies afforded in the force majeure clause may not align with the objectives for issuing a force majeure notice. Moreover, there may be other provisions that provide better relief than force majeure. One example would be if the force majeure provision only affords an extension of time to perform while other provisions may permit the recovery of lost profits or other prolongation costs. If there is any question regarding which provision should apply, a broader, more general notice may be more practicable in order to avoid limiting available rights and remedies should a dispute arise. Here are some key points to consider when drafting a general notice of delay as opposed to a force majeure notice.

  • Identify the event. Similar to a force majeure notice, the general notice should identify the event causing the delay or hindering performance. It should not call the event a “force majeure event” or reference the specific force majeure section of the contract. Doing so may give the appearance of simply invoking the force majeure clause instead of a more beneficial clause in the contract. The notice should instead establish the date when the event impacting performance began and provide dates when it is expected that the event will subside or cease interference with performance.
  • Explain how the event impacts performance. Provide a similar explanation as to how the event is preventing performance. Provide assurances that, once possible, performance under the contract will be completed.
  • Define the relief sought. Explain the relief sought as a result of the event. When calculating or determining the relief sought, be sure to take into account all relief sought by any “downstream” entities reporting to you as well. For example, if a general contractor needs 50 additional days to complete a task due to an unforeseen event, and a subcontractor informed the general contractor that it will need an extra 20 days to perform, the general contractor, in putting together its notice of delay, should request 70 days to encompass what will be needed for the project to be completed.
  • Do not limit rights or remedies. When it is unclear which clause should be invoked, do not limit your remedies to those in the force majeure clause. Do not cite to a specific provision for which you are providing notice when providing a general notice of delay. Because the goal is to provide a general notice for all possible applicable provisions offering relief in the contract, citing to a specific provision may waive the future exercise of other clauses. To simultaneously provide contractual notice of delay without citing to a specific provision in the contract, explain that the notice will be “in satisfaction of all notice requirements in the contract.” Finally, include a reservation of rights and remedies both within the contract and at law.
  • Provide “downstream” notices “upstream.” Particularly in construction, the entire supply chain, including suppliers, subcontractors and general contractors, may be impacted by a similar event. For anyone who has to pass notice “upstream,” it is imperative to provide any and all notices received from “downstream” parties. For example, a supplier may provide a notice to a subcontractor, who also provides notice to the general contractor. In order to give the property owner or developer a more complete understanding of the impact of the event, and to ensure you provide notice for all of the relief sought, it is critical to incorporate notices received from all subcontractors and suppliers in your upstream notice to the owner or developer.

Authors: 
Evelyn Small Traub, Partner, Troutman Sanders 
James E. Earle, Partner, Troutman Sanders 
Jessica Hajjar

On May 27, 2020, the DOL published final rules that provide a new safe harbor method for the electronic delivery of ERISA-required notices (the “Final Rules”).

The Final Rules apply to any participant, beneficiary, or alternate payee who provides the plan sponsor or administrator with an email address or smartphone number. Plan sponsors and administrators may deliver required ERISA notices by a combination of (i) providing the covered individuals with an electronic “notice of internet availability” that identifies a website where the ERISA notice is posted, and (ii) posting the notice on the website (i.e., “notice and access”). For many regular annual required notices, the “notice of internet availability” must be furnished only once per year. Alternatively, covered documents may be delivered directly to the covered individual’s email address. The rules apply only to required notices for 401(k) and other tax-qualified retirement plans, and do not apply to group medical or other health and welfare plans.

The new safe harbor is a small but welcomed step forward in reducing some of the administrative burdens related to tax-qualified retirement plans while also recognizing the wired world in which we live. Before using the new safe harbor, the plan administrator must notify participants of the new delivery method.

Background

Plan sponsors and administrators of 401(k) and other tax-qualified retirement plans must comply with numerous notice requirements under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Participants and beneficiaries must receive copies of summary plan descriptions, summaries of material modifications, summary annual reports, various investment disclosures, plan statements, and numerous other required notices.

In 2002, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) approved two “safe-harbor” methods to electronically deliver these notices. One easy-to-use safe harbor applies to employees who are “wired at work.” The other safe harbor applies to anyone else in the plan – i.e., employees who are not “wired at work,” former employees with accounts, beneficiaries, and alternate payees. These individuals must provide affirmative consent to electronic delivery.

These safe harbors have proved helpful and remain in effect. However, with the rapid changes in electronic options, they may have become a cumbersome way for employers to deliver notices. In October 2019, the DOL proposed a new, additional safe harbor that follows a “notice and access” electronic delivery model intended to provide a more convenient and efficient method for furnishing required ERISA notices, especially for individuals who do not qualify for the 2002 “wired at work” safe harbor. The finalized rules are substantially similar to the proposed rules, but some changes have been incorporated in response to concerns raised by commenters, as further described below.

New Electronic Delivery Safe Harbor

The Final Rules create a new safe harbor allowing ERISA plans to provide plan participants, beneficiaries and other individuals with a notice stating that the required plan disclosures will be made available on a website or to provide required disclosures directly by email (the “safe harbor”). However, a plan administrator who wishes to continue to rely on the existing 2002 safe harbor rules for e-delivery or continue to deliver by hand or first-class mail may continue to do so.

The Final Rules utilize a “notice and access” structure for furnishing ERISA required disclosures electronically. Under this structure, a plan administrator notifies the “covered individuals” of the availability of the documents with an electronic “notice of internet availability” (the “notice”) and then posts the required disclosures on a website. The requirement and parameters of this process are discussed below. The direct disclosure by email is also discussed below.

Effective Date

The Final Rules are effective on July 27, 2020. The DOL has stated that it will not take any enforcement action against a plan administrator that relies on the new safe harbor before the effective date in connection with the Federal government’s broader effort to respond to COVID-19.

Getting Started:

Initial Paper Notification of Default Electronic Delivery and Right to Opt Out

A plan administrator that decides to utilize the new safe harbor must send an initial notification on paper that some or all of the covered documents will be e-delivered to the participant’s electronic address on file. Additionally, the initial notification must alert the covered individual of his or her right to receive the covered documents in paper and that he or she may opt out of e-delivery, including the procedures for exercising such rights.

If the plan is currently using the 2002 safe harbor and wishes to adopt the new safe harbor, the plan administrator must send a one-time notification to each existing employee (including those who provided their affirmative consent under the 2002 safe harbor) notifying them of the plan’s intent to rely on the new safe harbor. Thereafter, the administrator must send this notification to each new employee who would be covered by the safe harbor.

Details of the New Safe Harbor

Covered Individuals

Under the Final Rules a “covered individual” is a participant, beneficiary or alternate payee for whom the employer, sponsor or plan administrator has an electronic address (e.g. email address, smartphone number, etc.). The Final Rules require, a condition to use the safe harbor, that the administrator receive an electronic address or number with which to communicate with the covered individual. This may include a personal or work email address. Because technology changes so often, the Final Rules do not limit the type of device a participant or beneficiary must have to be covered by the safe harbor.

Employers may use a work email address that it assigns to an employee for employment related purposes other than solely the delivery of covered documents under the new safe harbor.

Covered Documents

A plan administrator may use the safe harbor only for pension benefit plans, which includes 401(k) and other tax-qualified retirement plans. The safe harbor covers documents that are required to be provided to participants and beneficiaries under Title I of ERISA (“covered documents”). The definition of covered documents includes documents that must be sent as a result of the passage time – such as a summary annual report – and documents required as a result of a specific triggering event – such as a summary of material modification (SMM), blackout notice or claim denial. The plan administrator has discretion to only apply the safe harbor to certain covered documents.

The Final Rules do not apply to employee welfare plans. However, the DOL has reserved the right to expand the safe harbor in the future.

Timing of Notice of Internet Availability

The Final Rules require the plan administrator to send the notice to the covered individuals for a covered document at the time it becomes available. For example, if a plan is required to send six different covered documents, such as four quarterly benefit statements, a black out notice and a new Summary of Material Modifications (SMM) to its covered individuals over the course of the plan year, the plan administrator would have to send six notices in order to comply with the safe harbor.

However, a plan administrator may send a single combined annual notice for all or some of the following documents:

  • Summary plan descriptions (SPDs);

  • SMMs (after initial notice of availability);

  • Any covered document that must be furnished at least annually, as opposed to at the time of a specific event, such as:

    • Summary annual reports;

    • Annual funding notices;

    • Investment-related disclosures (identifying information, performance data, benchmarks, fee information, etc.);

    • Qualified default investment alternative notices;

    • Pension benefit statements; and

  • Any IRS required notices if authorized by the IRS to be delivered electronically by means of a combined notice.

If the plan administrator uses a combined notice, the timing requirement is satisfied if the combined notice is furnished each plan year. If the combined notice was furnished in the prior plan year, then the combined notice must be sent no later than 14 months following the date the prior plan year’s notice was sent.

Additionally, the Final Rules require the plan administrator to make the covered document available on the website by the covered document’s ERISA deadline.

Content of Notice of Internet Availability

The notice of internet availability must contain the following information:

  • A prominent statement (such as a title, legend or subject line) that reads, “Disclosure About Your Retirement Plan;”

  • A statement that reads, “Important information about your retirement plan is available at the website address below. Please review this information;”

  • An identification of the covered document by name, a brief description of the covered document and why it is important (if not evident from the name);

  • A specific website address that provides ready access to the covered document or in a combined notice covered documents (e.g., a direct link to the document or a log-in page that provides a link to the document);

  • A statement of the right to request and obtain a paper version of the covered document, free of charge, and an explanation of how to exercise this right;

  • A cautionary statement that the covered document is not required to be available on the website for more than a year or, if later, after it is superseded by a subsequent version;

  • A statement of the right to opt out of receiving covered documents electronically, and an explanation of how to exercise this right; and

  • A telephone number to contact the administrator or other designated representative of the plan.

Form and Manner of Providing the Notice of Internet Availability

Like most participant disclosures under ERISA, the DOL expects the notice to be clear and concise in explaining its content and importance. In order to satisfy the safe harbor, the notice must:

  • Be sent electronically to the covered individual’s electronic address;

  • Contain only the required content, though pictures, logos or similar design elements may be included, so long as the design is not inaccurate or misleading and the required content is clear;

  • Be furnished separately from any other documents or disclosures, including those required by ERISA, sent to the covered individual (unless the exception for combined notices applies); and

  • Be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant.

    • For this purpose, the DOL removed the requirement included in the proposed rules that the notices meet an objective general readability standard. The DOL will, however, continue to study ways to improve readability of the required notices.

Website

The plan administrator is also required to establish and maintain a website (or other electronic-based repository for information such as a mobile app) where covered individuals can easily access the covered documents. The administrator may delegate some responsibilities associated with the website to third party service providers. But, the administrator, as a plan fiduciary, must prudently select and monitor those service providers. Additionally, the administrator must take measures reasonably calculated to ensure the website meets certain requirements. For example, covered documents posted on the website must:

  • Be available on the website by the applicable ERISA deadline for furnishing the covered document;

  • Remain available on the website at least a year or if later, until it is superseded by a later version;

  • Be presented in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant;

  • Be available in a widely-used format suitable for reading online and printing clearly on paper;

  • Be searchable electronically by numbers, letters or words so participants can quickly find information about specific issues; and

  • Be available in a widely used format that allows the document to be permanently retained electronically (e.g., PDF).

A plan administrator must also take reasonably calculated measures to ensure the website protects the covered individual’s personal information and confidentiality.

Right to Request Paper Copies and Opt Out

The Final Rules require the plan administrator to maintain reasonable procedures to allow a covered individual to request a paper copy of the document free of charge. The Final Rules also require the plan administrator to establish reasonable procedures to give covered individuals the ability to opt out of e-delivery and receive only paper copies of some or all of the covered documents. If a participant decides to opt out, then all future covered documents must be delivered in paper, unless the covered individual decides to opt back into e-delivery.

Severance from Employment with Plan Sponsor

Covered individuals may continue to receive their covered documents by e-delivery even after they separate from employment with the plan sponsor. In such case, the plan administrator must take measures reasonably calculated to ensure the continued accuracy of the covered individual’s electronic address or obtain the covered individual’s new electronic address to ensure the covered individual’s continued access to the covered documents.

Alert About Invalid Electronic Addresses

The Final Rules require the system for furnishing the notice to provide an alert to the administrator in case a covered individual’s electronic address appears to be invalid or otherwise inoperable. The administrator then must take steps to obtain a new, valid electronic address. If the administrator cannot obtain a new valid address, then it must deem the covered individual to have opted out of e-delivery. As a best practice, plan administrators should keep a secondary electronic address for the covered individual on file and send the notice to the secondary address if they are alerted to an invalid or inoperable primary electronic address. The DOL has stated that this requirement is intended to help reduce the number of post-employment “lost participants.”

Temporary Unavailability

The Final Rules require plan administrators to have reasonable procedures in place to ensure that the covered documents are available. However, the Final Rules recognize that technological errors do occur and that they may render the covered documents temporarily unavailable. If the documents do become temporarily unavailable, the plan administrator must take prompt action to get the covered documents back online and available as soon as practicable following the time when the administrator knew or reasonably should have known the documents were unavailable.

Alternative to “Notice and Access” Method

As an alternative to the safe harbor described above, the administrator can send a covered document directly to a covered individual’s email address no later than the date the document must otherwise be furnished. The email must use a subject line that reads: “Disclosure About Your Retirement Plan” and include much of the same content as the notice of internet availability described above, such as the name of the document (including a brief description, if needed), a statement of the right to receive a paper copy and/or opt out of electronic delivery, and a contact phone number. The document can be delivered in the body of the email or as an attachment. The document must meet the same standards of readability and other requirements for documents that are posted on the website described above.

If you have questions about the new electronic distribution rules, or if you would like to implement the new delivery methods, please contact an attorney in the Troutman Sanders Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation Practice.

Published in Pratt’s Journal of Bankruptcy Law (Volume 16, Number 7, October 2020).

The current economic stress caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The loss of revenue and income by companies and individuals has already severely reduced tax revenue for state and local governments while at the same time many of these same governmental entities are expending vast sums fighting the pandemic. These increased expenditures are not likely to be offset by tax revenue. Quite the opposite appears true – increased costs with decreasing revenue will lead to large budget deficits. Absent aid from the Federal Government, states will be left with limited resources to assist municipalities facing budgetary shortfalls.

While states are not eligible for bankruptcy protection, municipal entities in certain states can commence proceedings under Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. A municipality must be authorized by state law to commence a Chapter 9 case. Some states, such as Georgia, explicitly prohibit such filings. While other states restrict the types of entities that can file, differentiating between water districts, school districts, healthcare districts, counties, municipal corporations and other public agencies. Some states require advance notice and approval of any filing and may even withhold permission to file. Thus, applicable state law must be reviewed carefully by both creditors and municipalities when assessing whether a municipal entity can seek Chapter 9 protection. 

If a municipality is not able to file for Chapter 9, an out of court restructuring may have to be pursued, such as a refinancing or extension of debt obligations, tender offers or exchanges or other negotiated resolutions. In certain states, financial boards or administrators may be appointed to oversee the finances of the municipality. States have a complex tangle of laws and regulations relating to municipalities and must be thoroughly reviewed when considering the possible outcomes of a municipal distress situation.

Below are frequently asked questions about municipal Chapter 9 bankruptcies. 

What is Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code?

Chapter 9 is part of the Bankruptcy Code that applies only to municipal entities. Chapter 9 also incorporates some, but not all other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 

What is considered a municipality for the Bankruptcy Code?

The Bankruptcy Code defines the term “municipality” as a “political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State.” Entities as large as major cities (i.e., Detroit, Vallejo and Harrisburg) along with major counties (i.e., Orange County and Jefferson County) and small public healthcare districts and entities (i.e., West Contra Costa Healthcare District and Suffolk County OTB) have commenced cases under Chapter 9.

Can a municipality be put into Chapter 9 involuntarily?

No. Only a municipality can initiate a Chapter 9 case. 

How is a Chapter 9 case commenced?

Assuming that applicable state law permits the commencement of a case, the municipality must vote to authorize the filing in accordance with its local charter or law. The municipality must file a petition initiating the case and must provide notice of the commencement of the case. Sometimes eligibility to file a case is hotly contested by creditors. However, unlike Chapter 11 debtors, Chapter 9 debtors are not required to file schedules or a statement of financial affairs. Rather, a Chapter 9 debtor is only required to file a list of creditors.

Must a municipality be insolvent to commence a Chapter 9 case?

Yes. Unlike Chapter 11 debtors, a municipality must demonstrate that it is insolvent as of the petition date. A municipality is insolvent if it is (i) generally not paying its debts as they become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute, or (ii) unable to pay its debts as they become due. The “generally not paying its debts as they become due” test requires a factual analysis of what payments have been missed and their relation to the municipality’s overall financial position. In determining whether the municipality is unable to pay its debts as they become due, courts look at the cash flow of the municipality rather than using a balance sheet test. The court also will look to the municipality’s expected projected near term fiscal condition.

The municipality must also demonstrate a desire to effect a plan to adjust its debts, and demonstrate one of the following:

(i) creditor agreement at time of filing;

(ii) failure of good faith negotiations;

(iii) negotiations were avoided as impracticable; or

(iv) the municipality reasonably believes a creditor may seek preference.

Can a municipality wind up liquidating?

No. A municipality cannot dissolve or be liquidated in a Chapter 9 proceeding. Applicable state law would govern any such result. 

What protections can a municipality obtain by filing?

The automatic stay comes into effect at the commencement of the case and stays all actions against the municipality. Also, many, but not all, of the provisions of Chapter 11 apply in a Chapter 9 proceeding. 

Must a municipality pay all of its debts in a Chapter 9 case?

No. A municipality can determine which debts (both pre- and post-petition) it will pay as part of the resolution of the case.

What happens to bonds issued by a municipality?

A municipality will not have to make principal and interest payments on bonds during the pendency of its case. However, bonds backed by special revenues, such as receipts from a designated project, may still be paid after the filing. Recent case law related to the Puerto Rico case found that the automatic stay only applied to the application of special revenues to payments of bonds and did not require the debtor to collect the special revenues for such application. Also, the holder of a bond that is backed by special revenues does not have recourse to the municipality.

What is the role of the Bankruptcy Court?

Unlike other bankruptcy cases, the role of the Bankruptcy Court is limited in a Chapter 9 case. The court may not interfere with the day to day operations (i.e., use of property or revenues) of the municipality or its political discourse. The court’s main role is to approve or disapprove a debt adjustment plan and enforce the automatic stay. The court can, with the consent of the parties, facilitate compromises and resolutions of issues. However, the municipality has full discretionary authority to settle matters without court oversight according to a recent decision in the Stockton case.

What happens to retirement plans in a Chapter 9 case?

A municipality has the ability to alter the terms of retirement plans while in bankruptcy. Unlike in a Chapter 11 case, there are no specific provisions relating to retirement and health plans in a Chapter 9 case. This, however, remains a hotly contested issue both legally and politically.

What happens to collective bargaining agreements in a Chapter 9 case?

A municipality has the ability to reject a collective bargaining agreement during its case. As with retirement and health benefits, there is no specific provision in Chapter 9 relating to collective bargaining agreements. However, Supreme Court precedent requires the municipality to engage in good faith negotiations with the union prior to seeking authority to reject the agreement.

Can a municipality reject other contracts in a Chapter 9?

Yes. The municipality has the ability to assume or reject executory contracts as part of its bankruptcy case. However, a lease to a municipality is not treated as an executory contract.

Are the safe harbors still applicable in a Chapter 9 case?

Yes. Counterparties to securities contracts, commodities or forward contracts, repurchase agreements, swaps and master netting agreements may still exercise their rights to liquidate, terminate or accelerate such contract after the commencement of the Chapter 9 case. The definitional requirements for exercising such rights must still be carefully reviewed prior to the exercise of any such rights.

Do I need to file a proof of claim in a Chapter 9 case?

Maybe. The municipality is required to file as list of creditors. If a claim is listed on the schedule, a proof of claim is deemed filed. However, if the claim is not listed or there is a dispute as to amount or status, a proof of claim must be filed.

How is a Chapter 9 case concluded?

As with a Chapter 11 case, the goal of a Chapter 9 case is the filing of a plan for the adjustment of the municipality’s debts. If the plan was not filed with the petition, it must be filed by a date fixed by the court. The court will schedule a hearing to consider confirmation of the plan. Once the plan is confirmed, it is binding on the debtor and all creditors (regardless of whether a claim was filed or deemed filed) and the debtor receives a discharge of all claims as of the date the plan is confirmed.

Reprinted with permission from the May 27, 2020 edition of the Delaware Business Court Insider. © 2020 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. (ALMReprints.com, 877.257.3382).

The Delaware Superior Court recently elaborated on the common interest doctrine in the context of a merger. In American Bottling Co. v. Repole, C.A. No. N19C-03-048 AML CCLD, Judge LeGrow held that privileged communications shared with a third party during the final stages of a merger were not subject to the common interest doctrine. Under the common interest doctrine, the attorney-client privilege will not be waived, despite disclosure to a third party, when the communication at issue was between a client or his lawyer and another lawyer who is representing another person in a matter of common interest. This doctrine will only apply, however, when the parties’ shared interest involves primarily legal issues, not a commercial common interest. This commercial versus legal distinction was at the heart of the court’s conclusion in American Bottling Co.

Background

The subject litigation arose from defendant BA Sports, Nutrition, LLC’s (Body Armor) termination of its distribution agreement with plaintiff the American Bottling Company (ABC) after ABC’s parent company, Dr. Pepper Snapple Group (DPSG), merged with one of Body Armor’s competitors, Keurig Green Mountain. As part of its due diligence process, Keurig and its advisers shared some otherwise privileged communications with DPSG regarding the distribution agreement’s termination clause and any associated fee, and sought DPSG’s input. The disclosure at issue took place after the merger agreement had been signed, but before the transaction closed.

Body Armor sought to compel the production of the allegedly privileged material. The materials in question included a chart that Keurig’s parent company’s counsel prepared during due diligence to identify additional information needed, as well as various emails between Ernst & Young, the accounting firm involved in due diligence, and DPSG executives and in-house counsel. According to Body Armor, Keurig waived its privilege when it shared the communications and materials with DPSG. In response, ABC asserted that the common interest doctrine applied based on the parties’ shared legal interest in protecting the merged company’s rights under the distribution agreement. Body Armor, on the other hand, argued that ABC’s identified common interest was commercial, not legal, and ABC had not carried its burden of proving privilege.

Analysis

The court began its analysis by recognizing that parties to a merger may share common interests between the time when a merger agreement is signed and the transaction closes. 3Com Corp. v. Diamond II Holdings, Inc., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 126, at *32 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2010). The court pointed out, however, that this does not mean that in these situations the parties’ interests are 100 percent aligned, and certainly does not mean that the parties’ interests are legal in nature, as required to be protected by the common interest doctrine. In order to rule on the application of the common interest doctrine in the case at hand, the court had to determine whether Keurig’s interests were aligned with DPSG’s, and whether those interests were primarily legal. It concluded that, although the parties’ interests may have been aligned for some purposes, the common interests were not primarily legal in nature. Therefore, the doctrine did not apply.

The court described a line of cases relevant to this analysis, observing that both the Delaware Superior Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery have held that negotiations regarding the terms of a business relationship or discussions regarding the execution of business goals are commercial in nature and not sufficient to provide protection under the common interest doctrine. For instance, in Glassman v. Crossfit, Inc., the Court of Chancery held that the plaintiff and the private equity firm to which she intended to sell her 50 percent ownership interest in Crossfit, Inc. did not share a common legal interest because the plaintiff could not establish that the communications had been shared in order to coordinate a joint litigation strategy regarding the approval of her divorce settlement and related sale of her Crossfit ownership interest. 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 248, at *9-11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2012). By contrast, the cases in which courts have found that a common legal interest exists typically involve coordinated action with an eye toward potential litigation. For example, in In re Lululemon Athleta Inc. 220 Litigation, the Court of Chancery held that Lululemon and its founder shared a common interest in communications coordinating a response to allegations of impropriety related to the founder’s stock trades, especially in light of the reasonable anticipation that litigation might ensue. 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 127, at *31-32 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2015). When applying these lines of cases to the case at hand, the court explained, “[t]he parties may well have an interest in positioning the post-merger entity so as to capitalize on the distribution agreements. But even if one aspect of that interest was avoiding litigation, the primary focus of the interest was plainly commercial.” The fact that one component of the parties’ communication may have touched on the desire to avoid litigation was of no consequence. As a result, ABC’s motion to compel was granted.

Takeaways

It appears that the Delaware courts, most recently the Superior Court, are taking a narrow view of what constitutes a legal interest sufficient to invoke the common interest doctrine, at least in the context of late-stage merger communications. In order to ensure that communications to a third party sharing a common interest are protected, parties asserting the privilege must be able to clearly articulate the precise legal ties connecting the parties. The Delaware Superior Court’s latest decision on the issue seems to suggest that litigation avoidance or preparation should be an integral part of the communication. Therefore, parties before the Delaware courts should proceed with caution when seeking to invoke the common interest doctrine for communications not directly related to litigation or made in anticipation of litigation or, when branching away from strictly litigation-related communications, should ensure that a clearly legal interest can be articulated.

Published in the Expert Analysis section of Law360 on May 11, 2020. © Copyright 2020, Portfolio Media, Inc., publisher of Law360. It is republished here with permission.

As more businesses rely on independent contractors and specialists, the courts continue to define where those independent contractors fit for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. Here we discuss recent decisions weighing whether the third-party waiver exceptions, where a third party is either a functional employee1 or essential for the provision of legal advice,2 apply to other third parties, including industry specialists, certified public accountants, property managers or investigators.

What is clear is that the trend toward using contractors and specialists shows no signs of slowing, and so counsel and their clients should be mindful of what communications might be protected as privileged. Below we offer best practices to ensure that privileged communications with contractors can be protected.

Cases Holding Third-Party Consultants Were Not Within the Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege

Recently, the court in Digital Mentor Inc. v. Ovivo USA LLC,3 a trademark case, held that disclosure of privileged communications to a general adviser waived the attorney-client privilege. Ovivo sought communications among Digital Mentor Inc., DMI’s counsel, and William Chastain, a third-party consultant.

Chastain joined DMI as an adviser in 2014, spent months learning about DMI’s industry and its unique technological breakthrough product, and participated in many of the negotiations between DMI and Ovivo, including the execution of a nondisclosure agreement between the parties. Chastain was never employed by DMI and was never paid for his services. DMI claimed Chastain was its “functional employee” and, therefore, communications among DMI and DMI’s attorney with Chastain were subject to attorney-client privilege.

Noting the lack of guidance from the Ninth Circuit, the court continued:

However, as one district court indicates, “the dispositive question is the consultant’s relationship to the company and whether by virtue of that relationship [s]he possesses information about the company that would assist the company’s attorneys in rendering legal advice.” … When answered in the affirmative, the consultant is “in all relevant respects the functional equivalent of an employee” and communications between corporate counsel and the consultant may be covered under attorney-client privilege.4

The court held that DMI had not shown that Chastain’s involvement met this criterion insofar as there was no documentation of Chastain’s duties with DMI or its corporate counsel, nor evidence that Chastain had specialized knowledge such that counsel would rely on him to facilitate legal advice for the company. Further, the court found “little to indicate that communications between Chastain and DMI’s counsel were primarily of a legal, as opposed to a business, nature.”5

The court in In re: Lincoln National COI Litigation6 evaluated Lincoln National’s claim that certain communications between its counsel and two consultants were privileged. Lincoln hired the consultants to help update its mortality assumptions and set new cost of insurance, or COI, rates and, taking the position that the reports themselves were not privileged, produced them. Lincoln however sought to withhold communications concerning legal advice provided by its outside counsel to its in-house lawyers.

The plaintiffs argued that, by producing the reports themselves, Lincoln had waived any privilege for the underlying documents. The special master deferred ruling on whether the reports themselves were privileged, and concluded that 10 such documents were not privileged.

Citing BouSamra v. Excela Health,7 the special master reasoned that the privilege would not extend to communications with the consultants unless their presence was “indispensable to the lawyer giving legal advice or facilitated the lawyer’s ability to give legal advice to the client.” Since Lincoln had disclaimed that the consultants’ services were necessary for the provision of legal advice, the documents were not privileged.

The court affirmed the special master’s ruling, finding that Lincoln failed to show that the purpose of the communications between its in-house counsel and employees was to obtain a legal opinion. With regard to communications with the consultants, Lincoln could not prove that their presence was either indispensable to the lawyer’s giving legal advice or facilitated the provision of that advice — nothing in the communications at issue addressed anything other than ordinary business activity.8

Finally, in United States v. Fisher,9 Fisher argued that two government exhibits should be excluded because they were protected by the attorney-client privilege claimed by his corporation, PCP. The government argued that the privilege was waived when PCP disclosed the documents to Atkins, the corporation’s CPA.

Fisher argued that the CPA’s role was to provide tax and accounting advice to assist a law firm in provide the company and its control group with legal advice. The court, noting that Fisher’s attorney’s argument was unsupported by any evidence or the emails themselves, held the exception to the third-party disclosure rule adopted in Kovel10 did not apply:

Fisher admits that PCP, not the lawyer, employed Atkins as an accountant. Moreover, it is not apparent from the emails that Atkins’s advice was being sought for purposes of obtaining legal advice by either the lawyer or PCP. Instead, it appears he was copied on the emails possibly for his input regarding a business decision, which would not be covered by the attorney-client privilege.11

The court held that Fisher failed to meet his burden to establish the existence of the privilege.

Cases Holding Third-Party Consultants Were Within the Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege

Consultants who have been specifically retained to assist in litigation, have an extensive history of working closely with a company, and have a unique set of skills have been found to be within the scope of the attorney-client privilege.

In Dialysis Clinic Inc. v. Medley,12 Dialysis Clinic owned and leased various commercial properties to third parties separate from dialysis clinics. Dialysis Clinic did not have in-house knowledge about or experience in management of commercial rental properties so the company retained XMi to manage its commercial properties.

XMi acted as Dialysis Clinic’s agent on an exclusive basis. XMi’s scope of work included negotiating lease renewals, collecting rents and dues, canceling or terminating leases upon Dialysis Clinic’s direction, and instituting, prosecuting and defending actions involving the properties. XMi handled all day-to-day operations and regularly communicated with Dialysis Clinic’s in-house and outside counsel about the properties.

Dialysis Clinic filed unlawful detainer actions against the owners of several of its properties, and the defendants served a subpoena on XMi, a nonparty to the detainer action. When Dialysis Clinic withheld emails between counsel and XMi as privileged, Medley filed a motion to compel production of the documents, arguing that sharing the communications with XMi waived the privilege.

The court, in affirming the lower court’s ruling that the privilege had not been waived, concluded that the functional equivalent analysis is a “sound approach” and that the following nonexclusive factors should be considered: (1) whether the nonemployee performs a specific role on behalf of the entity; (2) whether the nonemployee acts as a representative of the entity in interactions with other people or other entities; (3) whether, as a result of performing its role, the nonemployee possesses information no one else has; (4) whether the nonemployee is authorized by the entity to communicate with its attorneys on matters within the nonemployee’s scope of work to facilitate the attorney’s representation of the entity; and (5) whether the nonemployee’s communications with the entity’s attorneys are treated as confidential.

The court held that Dialysis Clinic had established that XMi was the functional equivalent of an employee and the privilege had not been waived.13

In Gibson v. Reed,14 which involved multiple state law claims arising from an Equal Employment Opportunity, or EEO, investigation into defendant Hastings’ complaint that Gibson sexually harassed her, defendant Snohomish County hired Reed to conduct an EEO investigation. The plaintiff sought to compel communications between Snohomish County officials and Reed related to Gibson.

The defendants argued that the communications involving Reed and the members of the Snohomish County Attorney’s Office were privileged because Reed was “functionally equivalent” to an employee of the county and that she was offering legal advice to her client, the county, regarding the investigation. The court held that Reed was a functional equivalent to a county employee and her communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege:

Reed was performing the type of investigations that Defendant Snohomish County’s regular EEO investigator Stacy Allen would have normally handled. Reed’s contract directed her to report to the Snohomish County Attorney’s office regarding her findings for the purpose of providing information and legal advice regarding her ongoing and completed EEO investigations. Reed’s contract explicitly explained that these communications were to be treated as confidential, and that both parties understood them to be privileged.15

Conclusion and Practice Pointers

As seen above, jurisdictions vary in their application of exceptions to waiver by third-party disclosure, so counsel should first determine what law might apply to a contract or anticipated dispute and plan their strategy accordingly. No matter whether a consultant is being retained to facilitate the provision of legal advice or will be working with counsel as the functional equivalent of an employee, counsel should initiate, document and manage the engagement.

In order to establish that a consultant is the functional equivalent of an employee, he or she must be authorized to act on the company’s behalf, including attending meetings and conferring with attorneys on the company’s behalf. Companies should document that fact in their engagement letters, as well as routine communications, particularly those with counsel.

If a consultant is being retained to assist counsel in providing legal advice, that fact should be made clear in the engagement letter, explaining the scope of the engagement and why the consultant’s service will enable counsel to provide legal advice. If a consultant has an ongoing relationship with the company to provide his or her expertise, and is then retained to assist counsel on a legal matter, a separate engagement letter should be entered into for the discrete assignment with counsel.

Counsel should emphasize at the outset of each consultant engagement that all communications and documents generated in the engagement should be considered confidential and only shared with individuals within the company who have a need for the information — and never with a third party without approval of counsel.

Finally, be mindful of the overriding requirement that, to be privileged a communication must have been made for the primary purpose of obtaining legal advice. No matter how essential or unique a contractor may be to the organization, unless a communication was made for that purpose, it will not be protected as privileged.

Endnotes

1 See In re: Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), where the court held that a public relations firm was the functional equivalent of the corporation’s employee and, therefore, the attorney-client privilege was not waived when corporation’s counsel shared communications with the public relations firm. In doing so, the court rejected the argument that third-party consultants came within the scope of the privilege only when acting as conduits or facilitators of attorney-client communications, the requirements of the original third-party waiver doctrine adopted in United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2nd Cir. 1961).

2 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2nd Cir. 1961). The Second Circuit held that the privilege could extend to communications between a client and a non-attorney third party if “the communication [is] made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer.” Id. at 922. In applying this rule, the court found that the privilege could reasonably extend to an accountant assisting a law firm in an investigation into an alleged federal income tax violation.

3 Digital Mentor, Inc. v. Ovivo USA, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-01935, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18527 (W.D. Wa. Feb. 4, 2020).

4 Id. at *4 (citations omitted).

5 Id. at 4-5.

6 In re: Lincoln National COI Litigation, No. 16-cv-06605-GJP, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40718 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2020).

7 BouSamra v. Excela Health, 210 A.3d 967 (Pa. 2019).

8 The court rejected Lincoln’s argument that the special master misread BouSamra as rejecting the functional equivalent doctrine as a straw man.

9 United States v. Fisher, No. 3_19cr76-MCR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34328 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2020).

10 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d. Cir. 1961).

11 U.S. v. Fisher, at *2-3 (citations omitted).

12 Dialysis Clinic, Inc. v. Medley, 567 S.W.3d 314 (Tenn. 2019).

13 Id.

14 Gibson v. Reed, No. C:18-0951, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94305 (W.D. Wash. June 5, 2019).

15 Id., at *2-3 (citations omitted); see also Pipeline Product. v. Madison Co., No. 15-4890-KHV, 2019 U.S. DIST Lexis 71601 (D. Kan., Ap. 29, 2019), in which the court found that a third-party PR consultant was the functional equivalent of an employee because they were the “right hand person” overseeing negotiating transactions and was authorized to communicate with counsel and others to act as the company’s representative.

This article was published in Law360 on April 28, 2020. © Copyright 2020, Portfolio Media, Inc., publisher of Law360. It is republished here with permission.

Nearly three years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands LLC,1 both parties and courts continue to grapple with what it means for a defendant to have a regular and established place of business in a judicial district that is not where a named domestic defendant in a patent infringement case is either incorporated or resides.

In light of this, venue discovery is an invaluable tool that plaintiffs should seek when defending their choice of venue and that defendants may use to successfully bolster their venue challenge. Under either circumstance, a litigant may use venue discovery to establish the necessary factual case on whether (or not) venue is proper in a district.

Patent Venue Background

The Supreme Court issued TC Heartland2 in May 2017, holding that venue in a patent infringement lawsuit against a domestic corporation is only proper in a district where the corporation resides (i.e., its state of incorporation) or in a district “where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”3

In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the patent venue statute, Title 28 of U.S. Code Section 1400(b), incorporates the broader definition of corporate residence contained in the general venue statute, Title 28 of U.S. Code Section 1391(c),4 and effectively overturned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.5 that had found that the general venue statute applied in a patent infringement case, such that venue was proper in “any district where there would be personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant at the time the action is commenced.”6

The Supreme Court also confirmed that its prior holding in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.7 — that Title 28 of U.S. Code Section 1400(b) “is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions” and is “not to be supplemented by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)” — still controls today.8

Following TC Heartland, the Federal Circuit issued In re: Cray Inc.,9 which provided district courts with a framework for assessing venue after TC Heartland and clarified that a defendant’s regular and established place of business, as described in Title 28 of U.S. Code Section 1400(b), must be (1) a physical place in the district; (2) a regular and established place of business; and (3) the “place of the defendant.”10

Facts supporting (or contradicting) these issues have formed the substance of requests for venue discovery.

When Have Courts Found Venue Discovery Appropriate?

Although TC Heartland did not alter the procedure for challenging venue (i.e., in a motion to dismiss or transfer), it did alter the relevant facts a court may consider in evaluating venue challenges.11 One way parties have attempted to avoid transfer or dismissal for improper venue is by seeking limited discovery on the issue of venue as an alternative to a ruling on the pending motion.

This allows the parties to develop a factual record early on in the case when fact discovery has not necessarily progressed, so the court can more accurately resolve venue challenges. While venue discovery has long been a reasonable request in response to venue challenges,12 TC Heartland changed the specific kinds of questions asked and information sought through venue discovery.

Courts generally have broad discretion over whether to order venue discovery,13 and a court may consider the following facts or issues in granting requests for venue-related discovery post-TC Heartland.

To Address Open Legal Questions

Courts have been willing to allow venue-related discovery shortly after new, precedential developments in patent venue law arise, even in cases where parties have already completed briefing but did not have a chance to consider the new developments.

Several examples occurred in the immediate aftermath of TC Heartland and Cray. In Celgene Corp. v. Hetero Labs Ltd.,14 for example, the court found venue-related discovery “especially appropriate … because [defendant] moved [to dismiss based on improper venue] before the Federal Circuit issued [In re] Cray.”15

Other orders that issued shortly after TC Heartland similarly allowed venue discovery in light of the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision.16

Nearly three years after TC Heartland, these issues continue to evolve. For example, in a recent decision, In re: Google Inc., the Federal Circuit confirmed that the physical presence of Google’s servers were insufficient for purposes of satisfying the place of business requirement under Cray, holding that a place of business “generally requires an employee or agent of the defendant to be conducting business at that place.”17

In attempting to clarify the place of business requirement, however, the Federal Circuit left open the question of whether a “regular and established place of business will always require the regular presence of a human agent” and whether “a machine could be an ‘agent.’”18

Because courts continue to resolve unsettled questions and raise additional potential questions, it may be worthwhile to ask for venue-related discovery related to facts that are newly confirmed to establish (or not establish) the required “place of business,” even after briefing on a challenge is technically complete.

To Resolve Specific Factual Disputes

More generally, venue discovery is often appropriate where the party seeking discovery can identify with some specificity the information relevant to venue that discovery may unearth.19 In St. Croix Surgical Systems LLC v. Cardinal Health Inc.20 for example, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ordered venue-related discovery where the defendant’s claims contrasted with publicly available information.21

Specifically, the defendant argued that it was “just a holding company outside of Texas’s jurisdiction” and had no regular and established business in the district, but, in response, the plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant had “both employees and locations throughout Texas.”22

In light of this contradictory information, and because the defendant had not explained why these employees and locations did not give rise to proper venue, the court ordered venue discovery to assist in resolving the dispute.23

As another example, in C.R. Bard Inc. v. Angiodynamics Inc., the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah permitted venue discovery to determine whether home offices of the defendant’s sales representatives were sufficient to establish venue.24

The court permitted venue discovery specifically because it had reason to doubt the reliability of a declaration the defendant submitted in support of its motion to dismiss or transfer because it contained information the declarant later admitted was incorrect and left several questions unanswered, including whether sales representatives stored product samples or literature in their homes or conducted product demonstrations in the district.25

The court therefore held that “developing the factual record [was] necessary to resolve [defendant’s] motion.”26 If the briefing for venue challenges raises more questions than it resolves, then asking for venue discovery will allow the parties an additional opportunity to bolster and clarify their positions to provide the court an accurate record to resolve the dispute.

To Investigate Related Corporate Entities

Courts also permit venue-related discovery regarding the relationship between corporate entities to determine whether the regular and established place of business of a defendant’s affiliate, agent, subsidiary or alter ego may be considered the place of the defendant under Cray.

In Cray, the Federal Circuit explained that relevant considerations in determining whether the regular and established place of business is, in fact, the place of the defendant include “whether the defendant owns or leases the place, or exercises other attributes of possession or control over the place.”27 Courts have therefore permitted venue discovery where the party seeking it can properly support its request for further inquiry into that relationship.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, for instance, permitted venue discovery after finding that (1) the record did not clearly establish whether any entity related to the defendant (e.g., affiliate, agent, subsidiary or alter ego) had a regular and established place of business in the district, and (2) the plaintiff’s request for venue discovery was not frivolous because it provided some evidence that defendant’s subsidiaries were incorporated or had a regular and established place of business in the district.28

The court held that it “should permit venue-related discovery, to allow the adversarial process to aid the court in making a fact-specific decision on a well-developed factual record.”29

In Blitzsafe Texas LLC v. Mitsubishi Electric Corp,30 the Texas district court also permitted venue discovery “because the parties’ dispute over venue turns in part on the degree of control that BMW exercises over BMW-brand dealerships.”31 The Blitzsafe court held that “[v]enue discovery with respect to those disputed factual premises” would “facilitate resolution of the venue dispute fully and fairly.”32

Unsupported allegations regarding corporate separateness or the relationship between corporate entities and one entity’s control over another, however, are unlikely to warrant venue-related discovery.33 Because a defendant’s related corporate entities may be relevant to determine whether or not venue is appropriate in a district, parties should investigate and seek venue discovery regarding not only the party’s physical presence in a district, but also the affiliates, subsidiaries or agents over which it may exert control.

Under What Circumstances Do Courts Deny Venue Discovery?

As discussed above, in seeking venue-related discovery, a party is more likely to be successful where it can point to specific facts regarding, for example, related corporate entities or the activities of remote employees that are not publicly available or otherwise missing from the record that would be relevant to evaluating proper venue.

In fact, courts frequently deny motions seeking venue discovery where a party fails to allege specific facts supporting its request or otherwise suggesting that venue-related discovery would be fruitful.34

In Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Accord Healthcare Inc.,35 for instance, the Delaware district court rejected plaintiff’s contentions regarding a single employee alleged to live and work in the district, because the plaintiff “point[ed] to no facts supporting a reasonable expectation that discovery would lead to evidence sufficient to satisfy any of Cray’s requirements.”36

The plaintiff did not allege, for example, that the defendant stored any of its materials at the Delaware employee’s home, that her home was “owned, controlled, or otherwise established” by the defendant or that the employee’s employment was conditioned on her continued residence in the district.37

And “[i]n the absence of any evidence that the employee cannot of her own free will move her home outside of the District,” the court found that the employee’s choice to make her home in Delaware did not transform her chosen abode into a regular and permanent establishment or place of business of the defendant and did not warrant discovery of her tax returns, reimbursement forms or pay stubs.38

Similarly, in NetSoc LLC v. Chegg Inc.,39 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York identified several deficiencies in finding the plaintiff failed to make any showing that additional discovery would “uncover additional facts” related to an employee that lived in and worked from home in the district:

NetSoc does not allege any basis to infer that Quora may have stored inventory at the employee’s home; that Quora conditioned his residence in New York; that it prevented him from leaving New York on his own volition; or that it required him to work from his home in New York. NetSoc also does not point to any marketing or advertising suggesting that Quora held out the employee’s home as part of its business, or that the employee actually engaged in business from his home.40

Given these findings, the court declined plaintiff’s requested venue discovery, finding it was “based on pure speculation.”41

Courts also routinely refuse venue discovery where the relevant venue-related facts are undisputed42 or the party’s request for venue discovery is nonspecific43 or overbroad.44

Courts also have rejected requests for venue discovery where it would serve no purpose45 — i.e., where the record is already clear,46 the parties have already engaged in discovery sufficient to explore venue,47 and/or additional discovery cannot cure the legal flaws in the requesting party’s venue claims.48

What Limits Do Courts Place on Venue Discovery?

When courts do permit venue related discovery, it may be subject to some topical or temporal limits set by the parties or the court. In Celgene Corp. v. Hetero Labs. Ltd., for example, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey ordered production of specific categories of venue-related documents concerning leases, corporate structure, assets and liabilities, hotel records, rental agreements, tax returns and specific, area-based marketing campaigns.49

The court may also set limits on the number of requests for documents, sets and numbers of interrogatories, or depositions that may occur pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6)50 or explicitly provide the topics and issues appropriate for venue-related discovery.51

If parties do not issue sufficiently narrow discovery requests themselves, the court may issue a protective order to remedy overbroad or excessive requests.52 As such, in the event a court allows venue discovery, practitioners should attempt to limit and narrowly tailor their discovery requests to the specific venue issues at hand.

Conclusion

The patent venue landscape is far from settled, and the facts relevant to venue are often unclear or disputed at the outset of a case. Litigants asserting or facing a venue-related challenge should consider how and whether venue discovery can bolster their position, as well as what specifically to request and why it might be helpful.

Endnotes

1 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).

2 Id.

3 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).

4 Id. at 1516-17.

5 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

6 Id. at 1583.

7 353 U.S. 222 (1957).

8 Id. at 229; TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1517.

9 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

10 Id. at 1360.

11 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

12 See, e.g., United Fixtures Co., Inc. v. Base Mfg., No. 6:08-cv-506, Dkt. No. 52 (Aug. 4, 2008) (granting venue discovery regarding defendant’s contacts with forum state).

13 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).

14 No. 17-cv-3387, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34025, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2018).

15 Id. at *9.

16 Regenlab USA LLC v. Estar Techs. Ltd., No. 16-cv-08771, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131627, at *6-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2017) (“in the absence of any binding precedent directly on point, the Court finds that some additional factual development would be useful”); InVue Sec. Prods. Inc. v. Mobile Tech., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00270, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125693, at *1-4 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2017).

17 In re Google, No. 2019-126, Dkt. No. 36 at 10, 17 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2020).

18 Id. at 17.

19 See, e.g., Genentech Inc. v. Eli Lilly Co., No. 18-cv-1518, Dkt. No. 39 at 1-2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2018) (granting ex parte motion for leave to conduct discovery regarding venue before filing opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding “discovery may be useful in this matter, and therefore permit[ting] discovery on th[e] issue”); Celgene Corp. v. Hetero Labs Ltd., No. 17-cv-3387, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34025, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2018) (the Court’s decision to permit venue-related discovery is also “based on the strength of the parties’ arguments”).

20 No. 2:17-cv-00500, Dkt. No. 64 at 4-5 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2018).

21 Id. at 5; see also MV3 Partners LLC v. Roku, Inc., No. 18-cv-00308, Dkt. No. 58 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2019) (granting venue discovery in light of a “substantive dispute over the relevance that certain Roku, Inc. employees would have as witnesses or deponents”); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00258, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126523 (E.D. Tex. July 21, 2017) (finding good cause for defendant’s motion for expedited venue discovery following motion to transfer based on plaintiff assertions regarding where relevant prosecuting attorneys and executives live and work that are inconsistent with public evidence).

22 No. 2:17-cv-00500, Dkt. No. 64 at 2-4.

23 Id. at 3-5.

24 C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Angiodynamics, Inc., No. 2-12-cv-00035, Dkt. No. 158 (D. Utah Mar. 3, 2020).

25 Id. at 4.

26 Id. at 4.

27 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363; see also Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chemicals Inc., 757 F.2d 1256, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“venue in a patent infringement case [may be] proper with regard to one corporation by virtue of the acts of another, intimately connected, corporation”).

28 See Javelin Pharms., Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Ltd., No. 16-cv-224, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201175, at *8-10 (D. Del. Dec. 1, 2017) (“the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ theory – that the ‘places’ of any Mylan entity, including Mylan affiliates, subsidiaries, parents, or alter egos, may be attributable to the named Mylan Defendants for purposes of venue – is not frivolous and justifies some limited venue-related discovery”).

29 See Javelin Pharms., Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Ltd., No. 16-cv-224, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201175, at *8 (D. Del. Dec. 1, 2017).

30 No. 2:17-cv-00430, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86350, at *14 (E.D. Tex. May. 22, 2019).

31 Id.

32 Id. (citations omitted); see also IBM Corp. v. Expedia, Inc, No. 17-cv-1875, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123739, at *25-28 (D. Del. July 24, 2019) (granting jurisdictional discovery regarding whether a franchise location could be said to be a place of business of defendant where “there are many unanswered questions in the record about the relationship between the Bear, Delaware location and the business of [defendant].”).

33 See, e.g., Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Systems, 158 F. Supp. 3d 916 (E.D. Va. 2017) (Plaintiff did not “proffer[] any facts suggesting that the corporate separateness between [the plaintiff] and [plaintiff’s subsidiary] is a mere fiction”); Galderma Labs, L.P. v. Medinter U.S., LLC et al., No. 18-cv-1892, Dkt. No. 98 at 11-14 (D. Del. Oct. 25, 2019) (denying jurisdictional discovery related to alter ego allegations where “Plaintiffs have failed to point to any record evidence relating to most of the factors that the Third Circuit has used to address corporate separateness”; “what little evidence Plaintiffs have put forward does not speak impactfully to the prospect that Anteco’s corporate separateness from Attwill is a ‘legal fiction’”; “Plaintiffs’ allegations are also wanting as to the second element of the alter ego test: the requirement that any closeness or intermingling of the corporate forms promotes fraud, unfairness, or injustice.”).

34 See, e.g., Green Source Holdings, LLC v. Ingevity Corp., No. 1:18-cv-1067, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76003, at *14-15 (W.D. Ark. May 6, 2019) (“Plaintiff does not indicate any specific facts it believes it would uncover through venue discovery…in light of Defendants’ specific declaration and the lack of any concrete proffer from Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that venue discovery is warranted.”); Groove Digital, Inc. v. United Bank et al., No. 1:18-cv-00966, Dkt. No. 77 at 2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2019) (“Here, as in Symbology Innovations, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that suggests FIS maintains a continuous presence in this district and has not identified any potential sources of evidence that suggest a period of jurisdictional discovery would be more than a fishing expedition. For these reasons the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for a period of jurisdictional discovery.”).

35 No. 18-cv-1043, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101106, at *16-20 (D. Del. June 17, 2019).

36 Id.

37 Id. at *15.

38 Id. at *18.

39 No. 18-cv-10262, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171167, at *13-15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2019).

40 Id.

41 Id. at *14-15.

42 Olivia Garden, Inc. v. Stance Beauty Labs, LLC, No. 17-cv-05778, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2018) (denying venue discovery where “[p]laintiff does not explain what new facts additional discovery would unearth” because plaintiff did not substantively dispute defendant’s declaration supporting its motion to dismiss for improper venue); BMC Software, Inc. v. Cherwell Software, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-01074, Dkt. No. 55 at 3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 21, 2017) (denying venue-related discovery where “the Court finds no inconsistencies among the facts proffered by the parties”); Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distributors, Inc., No. 17-cv-23060, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180699, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2017)(rejecting request for venue-related discovery where plaintiff failed to “set out what discovery it seeks” and did not provide an affidavit in support of its own position or dispute the claims defendant made in its supporting affidavit).

43 See, e.g., Green Fitness Equip. Co. LLC v. Precor Inc., No. 18-cv-00820, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109479, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2018) (denying venue related discovery where plaintiff “identifies no specific fact it hopes to obtain from discovery that might reveal that venue is proper”).

44 See, e.g., Timely Inventions, LLC v. Netgear, Inc., No. 17-cv-08864, Dkt. No. 40 at 3-4 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2018) (denying venue related discovery, noting “the discovery that was generally proposed—multiple depositions, requests for production, and requests for admission—appears to be more extensive than what other courts have allowed”).

45 Cupp Cybersecurity LLC v. Symantec Corp., No. 3:18-cv-01554, Dkt. No. 44 at 10 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2018).

46 See, e.g., Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Grp. Inc., No. 15-cv-980, Dkt. No. 315 at 33 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017) (“The record is already sufficient to demonstrate that Delaware is an improper venue.”).

47 See, e.g., Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, No. 3:16-cv-00506, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3281, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2018) (“[T]he parties have been actively engaged in discovery. [Plaintiff] has provided no basis for a good faith argument that [defendant] has a regular and established place of business in this district.”); Valspar Corp. v. PPG Indus., No. 16-cv-1429, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123501, at *14 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2017) (“the parties have already exhaustively explored the question of PPG’s connections to this forum”).

48 Palomar Tech., Inc. v. MRSI Sys., LLC, No. 15-cv-1484, Dkt. No. 39 at 14-15 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2018) (denying venue related discovery where “Plaintiff puts forward no reason why its discovery request will cure the legal flaws in its argument”); see also Niazi v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., No. 17-cv-183, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183849, at *13 (Nov. 7, 2017) (finding evidence plaintiff seeks through venue discovery de minimus and not sufficient to establish regular and established business).

49 No. 17-3387, Dkt. No. 292 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2019).

50 See, e.g., Endonovo Therapeutics, Inc. v. BioElectronics Corp., No. 19-4465, Dkt. No. 31 at 2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2019) (allowing “six narrowly tailored interrogatory request and two narrowly tailored requests for production” regarding “any leases held by Defendant for physical space/property in California”); Xodus Med. Inc. et al. v. Allen Med. Sys., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00581, Dkt. No. 34 (W.D. Penn. Nov. 8, 2017) (granting venue-related discovery limited to one set of 15 interrogatories, 10 requests for production, and two depositions); XR Communications LLC dba Vivato Techs. v. Ruckus Wireless, Inc., No.17-cv-02961, Dkt. No. 70 at 1-2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2017) (limiting requested venue discovery to three requests for admission, two interrogatories, and one two-hour deposition, and cautioning plaintiffs to consider Cray in conducting additional venue discovery and use narrowly tailored requests).

51 See, e.g., InVue Sec. Prods. Inc. v. Mobile Tech., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00270, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125693, at *3-4 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2017) (ordering limited discovery on specific topics for a specified time period).

52 See, e.g., Modern Font Application LLC v. Peak Restaurant Partners, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-221, Dkt. No. 51 at 1 (D. Utah Sept. 25, 2019) (permitting one, four-hour 30(b)(6) deposition “to obtain further information as to whether Defendant has a regular and established place of business within the District of Utah”), Modern Font Application LLC v. Peak Restaurant Partners, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-221, Dkt. No. 57 (D. Utah Nov. 14, 2019) (granting protective order finding several 30(b)(6) topics overbroad and outside the scope of the Judge’s initial Order).

This article was published on July 19, 2020 in the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation blog.

As COVID-19 related economic disruptions place unprecedented stress on cash flows, the risk of insolvency is a new and growing concern for many businesses. Against the backdrop of a decades-long growth in corporate debt, boards of directors are making decisions that have the potential for pitting the interests of creditors against the interests of equity shareholders. As the financial health of a business deteriorates, its directors should be cognizant that their fiduciary duties may shift or expand with respect to these different constituencies if and when the company actually crosses over into insolvency.

With a focus on comparing California and Delaware law, this article briefly describes how insolvency can affect directors’ fiduciary duties, and discusses ways that directors can minimize the risk of personal liability as those duties shift.

Solvency: Business as Usual

For a solvent company, the fiduciary duties owed by the directors are straightforward. As explained by the Delaware Supreme Court, one of the core principles of corporate law is that the “board of directors has the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.”[1] Thus, “the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.”[2] While solvent, the fiduciary duties of a company’s directors do not generally extend to its creditors, whose rights are derived instead from the terms of the contracts they negotiate with the company.[3] Similarly, under California law, the directors of a solvent corporation owe their fiduciary duties to the company and to its shareholders.[4]

The ‘Zone of Insolvency’

When businesses begin to experience acute financial distress, they are sometimes described as operating in the “zone of insolvency” or the “vicinity of insolvency.” This is a vague concept, and its boundaries are not defined by the law.[5] Indeed, in Delaware today, the courts are clear that there is no such thing as a “legally recognized zone of insolvency.”[6]

Nevertheless, “zone of insolvency” is an oft-heard phrase, and creditors have argued that a company’s directors should owe them fiduciary duties when the company is in such a “zone.” Although it may still be an open question in some states, Delaware and California have both squarely rejected this contention. The Delaware Supreme Court, for example, could not be more clear, declaring that “[w]hen a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus of Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation . . . for the benefit of its shareholder owners.”[7] Similarly, in California, the leading case on point confirmed that fiduciary duties are not owed to creditors “by virtue of [the company] operating in the ‘zone’ or ‘vicinity’ of insolvency.”[8]

Insolvency: Expanded Duties

In both Delaware and California, however, directors’ duties do expand when the company crosses over into actual insolvency. There are well-established legal tests for determining when a company crosses over into actual insolvency. But these are not bright-line tests; for example, the trigger is not the filing of bankruptcy or other statutory proceedings.[9] Insolvency requires a fact-based inquiry, and the tests can vary somewhat from state to state.

In Delaware, solvency is generally determined by reference to two tests: (1) the balance sheet test and (2) the equitable insolvency (aka cash flow) test. Delaware courts typically consider both tests, and so long as a business can satisfy either one, the company may be deemed solvent.[10] Under the balance sheet test, a company is solvent if the reasonable market value of its assets is not less than the stated value of its liabilities.[11] The equitable insolvency test asks whether the company can meet its present and/or future debts as they come due.[12]

Likewise, courts in California determine solvency under either (1) the balance sheet test or (2) the “ability-to-pay” test. As in Delaware, California’s balance sheet test looks to whether the sum of the company’s debts is greater than the sum of its assets.[13] Under California’s “ability-to-pay” test, a company that is generally not paying its debts as they become due (other than as a result of a bona fide dispute) may be presumed insolvent.[14] Similarly, a company may be deemed insolvent if, due to a challenged distribution to shareholders, it would “likely be unable to meet its liabilities . . . as they mature.”[15]

Insolvency “places the creditors in the shoes normally occupied by the shareholders – that of residual risk-bearers.”[16] In the hierarchy of distributions, shareholders are presumptively “out of the money” as creditors are paid first from the residual assets of the company. For that reason, Delaware brings creditors, along with the shareholders, within the scope of directors’ fiduciary duties.[17] In an insolvent corporation, creditors have standing, alongside the shareholders, to bring derivative claims on behalf of the insolvent company to recover for alleged harm to the business caused by the directors’ alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. Critically, however, the fact of insolvency does not create or confer any new rights on the part of the creditors to assert direct claims on their own behalf against corporate directors for any losses.[18]

California follows a different approach. In the leading case, the court reasoned that, because California’s governing statute defines directors’ fiduciary duties as running to the corporation and its shareholders, “there is no broad, paramount fiduciary duty of due care or loyalty that directors of an insolvent corporation owe the corporation’s creditors solely because of a state of insolvency.”[19] Nevertheless, California has long recognized the so-called “trust fund doctrine” under which “all of the assets of a corporation, immediately on its becoming insolvent, become a trust fund for the benefit of all of its creditors in order to satisfy their claims.”[20] In short, under California law, insolvency does not flip the locus of directors’ fiduciary duties from shareholders to creditors, and does not give rise to any duties to creditors that are “paramount” to the duties owed to the corporation itself (and its shareholders). Instead, “the scope of any extra contractual duty owed by corporate directors to the insolvent corporation’s creditors is limited in California . . . to the avoidance of actions that divert, dissipate, or unduly risk corporate assets that might otherwise be used to pay creditors claims [including] acts that involve self-dealing or the preferential treatment of creditors.”[21]

Considerations for Directors in the COVID-19 World

Ever since the COVID-19 pandemic started to spread around the globe, business leaders have faced myriad unexpected dangers (and sometimes opportunities) that require attention and quick decisions under exceptionally stressful and rapidly evolving conditions. How directors may best discharge their fiduciary duties in this extraordinary environment will depend on the particular circumstances they face, and they should seek counsel to help guide them through a given situation. As a general matter, some of the things directors can do are:

  • Actively monitor the performance of the business and work with management to identify risks that COVID-19 poses for the company and how best to manage those risks.

  • For public reporting companies and companies raising capital, consider the company’s disclosures and guidance regarding the risks and impacts of COVID-19 on the business.

  • Pay close attention to changes in the company’s financial condition, with particular focus on liquidity. Is the company at risk of insolvency? Is it still solvent?

  • Monitor the company’s financial and other contractual obligations and understand management’s plans to meet those obligations in the near term.

  • Critically assess the need for, sources of, and effect of additional fundraising.

  • Evaluate carefully the effect of deploying the company’s cash, particularly for payments of dividends and repurchases of company securities, where directors may have statutory personal liability for authorizing these transactions beyond statutory limits.[22]

  • Look to whether the company has policies to prevent insider trading during this period of volatility, and whether compliance with those policies is being properly monitored.

  • Be alert for activist shareholders or others positioning to take or increase corporate control, and consult with counsel on steps that might be taken to address vulnerabilities.

  • Obtain relevant, adequate information from management, seek input from company advisers and experts where appropriate, and document these informational efforts in board materials.

  • Be alert for and expressly address real or perceived conflicts of interest in making decisions, and ensure that all decisions are made with appropriate process protections and by independent and disinterested directors.

  • Maintain corporate formalities and good records, including timely and complete written meeting minutes, even with respect to virtual communications and meetings held on short notice.

Protections Against Personal Liability

Even when directors scrupulously discharge their duties, unhappy lenders and investors may bring claims seeking to impose personal liability for corporate losses on the directors. Just the cost of defending against these claims can be substantial. It is therefore entirely appropriate for the company to take action to eliminate or reduce the threat of these claims.

The corporate laws of Delaware and California, like most states, mandate corporate indemnification of directors who are successful in the defense of any claims made against them based on their service as directors.[23] Additionally, in both states, corporations are permitted to advance defense costs if the individual directors promise to repay the advances if they are later found not to have met the minimum standard of conduct for indemnification (generally summed up as good faith compliance with the duty of loyalty).[24] Of course, the trouble with corporate indemnification and advancement is that an insolvent company, by definition, is unlikely to have sufficient funds to protect the directors.

Two other measures are available to protect directors, however, even in insolvency. First, most companies have exculpation clauses in their articles of incorporation that shield directors from out-of-pocket loss due to claims of a breach of the fiduciary duty of care (but not for the duty of loyalty).[25] Second, and perhaps most importantly, good corporate liability insurance may be purchased by the corporation,[26] including coverage designed to pay directors’ legal defense costs (a form of loss) for defending against allegations of “wrongful acts.” In particular, “Side A” coverage is designed to protect directors even when the corporation cannot or will not indemnify them, such as during insolvency. Depending on the terms of the policy, Side A coverage may begin paying covered losses (including defense costs) without any deductible or self-insured retention.

Directors should consult with legal counsel and the company’s insurance broker to assess the quality of coverage for times of corporate financial distress.

Endnotes

[1] Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998).

[2] N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007). As a general matter, officers of a Delaware corporation owe the same fiduciary duties as do its directors, though officers may not enjoy the full panoply of protections afforded to directors (such as the exculpation clauses in corporate charter documents). See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009).

[3] Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988); Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Bain Capital Fund VII, LLC, 922 A.2d 1169, 1180 (Del. Ch. 2006); Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).

[4] Cal. Corp. Code § 309; Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1037, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 891 (2009), rev. denied, 2010 Cal. LEXIS 1461 (Feb. 3, 2010).

[5] See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 98 n.20; Production Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 789-90 & n.56 (Del. Ch. 2004); see also Berg & Berg, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1037 (referring to “that ill-defined sphere known as the ‘zone of insolvency’”).

[6] Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 546 (Del. Ch. 2015).

[7] Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101 (emphasis added); see also Quadrant, 115 A3d at 546 (“The only transition point that affects fiduciary duty analysis is insolvency itself.”).

[8] Berg & Berg, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1041 (“we hold that there is no fiduciary duty prescribed under California law that is owed to creditors by directors of a corporation solely by virtue of its operating in the ‘zone’ or ‘vicinity’ of insolvency”).

[9] Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787-789 (Del. Ch. 1992).

[10] Quadrant, 115 A.3d at 556.

[11] See Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 195 n.74 (Del. Ch. 2006).

[12] Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc. (In re R.M.L. Inc.), 92 F.3d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1996); See Production Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 782 (Del. Ch. 2004).

[13] Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.02(a).

[14] Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.02(b).

[15] Cal. Corp. Code § 501.

[16] Production Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 791 (Del. Ch. 2004).

[17] Id. (citing Geyer, 621 A.2d at 789).

[18] Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 103.

[19] Berg & Berg, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1041.

[20] Id. at 1040 (quotations and citations omitted).

[21] Id. at 1041.

[22] Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 174; Cal. Corp. Code § 316.

[23] Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 145(c); Cal. Corp. Code § 317(d); Cal. Lab. Code § 2802 (mandating indemnification of employees for expenses incurred in the discharge of lawful duties).

[24] Del. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 145(a) and (b); Cal. Corp. Code § 317(b).

[25] Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 102(b)(7); Cal. Corp. Code § 204.

[26] Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 145(g); Cal. Corp. Code 317(i).

In response to the financial pressures of the COVID-19 crisis, many employers are considering pay reductions as an alternative to furloughs or layoffs. Most states require advance notice of these changes, and some states have specific timing and/or form-of-notice requirements. These requirements are detailed below.

Because of the current economic environment, some employers may not be able to give the required advance notice before wage reductions go into effect. While state departments of labor have not issued guidance waiving these requirements, they may be less likely to penalize employers for failure to give sufficient notice in the current environment, particularly if the pay reduction is being done to prevent layoffs. That said, employers should still try to give as much notice as possible of pay reductions, even if the notice period falls short of what is required under state law.

States With Specific Timing and/or Form-of-Notice Requirements

State

Amount of Notice Required

Specific Form of Notice Required

Other Notes

Alaska

1 pay period

None

 

California

7 calendar days

None

Notice requirement does not apply to exempt employees

Maine

1 business day

None

 

Maryland

1 pay period

None

 

Missouri

30 calendar days

None

 

North Carolina

24 hours

None

 

Nevada

7 calendar days

None

 

New York

7 calendar days

Hourly Employees

Exempt Employees

Weekly Rate / Salary for Fixed Number of Hours (40 or fewer)

 

South Carolina

7 calendar days

None

 

The following states require advance notice of pay reductions, but do not specify the amount of advance notice required or provide for any particular form of notice: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, New Jersey, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Washington, D.C, West Virginia and Wisconsin. If possible, we recommend that employers give at least seven calendar days of notice to satisfy that the notice is given in “advance” in these states.

The following states do not explicitly require advance notice of pay reductions: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Wyoming. Although these states do not explicitly require advance notice, we recommend as a best practice that employers still provide advance notice (seven calendar days, if possible).

Iowa does not generally require advance notice of pay reductions, but may require one pay period of advance notice if an employer has previously violated Iowa wage payment laws.

Penalties for failure to provide the required advance notice vary by state. A common penalty amount is $50 per employee per day that the notice requirement is not met.

Employers are encouraged to consult with counsel before implementing pay reductions to ensure that the reductions are compliant with applicable law.

This article was published on April 24, 2020 on ConsensusDocs.

Much has been written about whether and how COVID-19 qualifies as a force majeure event, and some additional information can be found here. But typical force majeure provisions entitle contractors to only schedule relief. While force majeure clauses may limit exposure to liquidated or consequential damages for delays, contractors who incur increased costs resulting from COVID-19 related delays should carefully evaluate the entirety of their contractual rights to not only an extension of time, but also recover prolongation costs. To assist in this endeavor, this article looks beyond force majeure to other potentially relevant contractual provisions. Potential remedies under the various contractual clauses discussed below will depend on the specific contractual language and project-specific facts.

Change-in-Law Provisions

A change-in-law provision is a common contractual provision that may allow for additional time, money or both if there is a change to a federal or state law, executive order or other governmental action during contract performance. COVID-19 has produced multiple government orders and directives that have impacted construction throughout the country. A 50-state account of these orders and directives can be found here. Change-in-law provisions may appear in broader force majeure provisions, or as standalone clauses.

Emergency Provisions

Some contracts include provisions for relief in the case of an emergency. For example, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) provides a standard emergency clause:

In an emergency affecting safety of persons or property, the Contractor shall act, at the Contractor’s discretion, to prevent threatened damage, injury, or loss. Additional compensation or extension of time claimed by the Contractor on account of an emergency shall be determined as provided in Article 15 and Article 7.

See AIA Document A201-2017 § 10.4.

Emergency provisions may provide contractors the right to suspend work and seek consequent compensation and time extensions. Furthermore, emergency provisions may provide an avenue for recovery of additional compensation and time related to isolated events, such as shutting down a project for a short period to disinfect a work area after an infected employee leaves the worksite or leasing a larger space to hold project meetings to comply with social distancing requirements.

Escalation/Unit Price Provisions

Escalation or unit price provisions entitle the contractor to an equitable adjustment in the contract or material price if the character or quantity of an item is now so different as to create a substantial inequity. COVID-19 has, and will likely continue to, dramatically affect global supply chains, resulting in increased lead times and costs for project-specific equipment and materials outside the contemplation of the contracting parties. However, escalation or unit price provisions typically require that any change — here the COVID-19 pandemic — must create a substantial inequity mandating relief, a fact-specific analysis.

Change Order Provisions

Change order provisions may allow contractors to recover additional compensation and time as the result of COVID-19 disruptions. In certain instances, contractors may receive informal or written directives from an owner or, in the instance of a subcontractor, a general contractor related to COVID-19 that unilaterally mandate changes to an existing contract’s scope of work. In these cases, contractors should request written orders for any directed changes prior to commencement of work, if practicable, and, in any event, document the time and costs associated with any directed change.

Stop Work Notices and Provisions

Under certain circumstances, typically due to certain acts, omissions or directives by the owner, a contractor may be permitted or required to stop work. In that event, the contractor may be entitled to an extension of time and reasonable costs related to the shutdown, including delays and demobilization and mobilization costs. Stop work provisions typically apply under very specific situations and require strict compliance with notice requirements.

Suspension and Termination Provisions

Suspension of work clauses may provide an avenue of relief for contractors. For example, some suspension provisions include the right to suspend project work during the presence of “hazardous conditions” at the project worksite. The actual or potential presence of COVID-19 at a project worksite may arguably constitute a hazardous condition, allowing the contractor to suspend work and obtain time extensions and recovery of costs related to the suspension period.

Contractual termination provisions typically require stoppage of work on a project for a defined period of time as a result of a court order or government act. If applicable, termination provisions may entitle contractors to compensation for work performed, reasonable overhead and profit for work not executed, and costs incurred due to termination. Since termination of a contract is an extreme remedy, contractors should give careful and due consideration to the effects of invoking a termination provision.

Additional Considerations for Contractual Remedies

Providing proper notice is typically a condition precedent to the exercise of the above contractual remedies. Accordingly, contractors are advised to closely examine and strictly follow contractual and, in the event of public works, administrative notice requirements to help reserve rights and avoid potential claims of wavier. While COVID-19 regulations and orders may impact your ability to strictly comply with certain notice requirements — e.g., in-person service requirements — substantial compliance under the circumstances may excuse failure to achieve literal compliance with contractual notice requirements. In that event, contractors are well-advised to document all efforts to provide notice. Furthermore, exercise of the above-discussed contractual provisions may invoke contractual dispute resolution provisions. For example, the AIA Standard General Conditions require that most claims first be submitted to the Initial Decision Maker, and then be subject to mediation as a condition precedent to binding dispute resolution. Ignoring dispute resolution provisions may impact your ability to submit a claim or recover additional compensation. In the event of claims arising from COVID-19, contractors should consider providing compliance notices to subcontractors regarding their potential impact claims, emphasizing the importance of timely claim submissions, the failure of which may impact the contractor’s ability to pass-through subcontractor claims to the owner.

The potential applicability of contract provisions to COVID-19 impacts on your project is a time-sensitive and deliberate process for contractors suffering from delays and cost increases. The information above is for informational purposes only and is not intended to serve as providing legal advice. If you have further questions or seek advice based on your specific fact situation and contractual provisions, please reach out to any members of the Pepper Hamilton and Troutman Sanders Construction groups. In addition, Pepper Hamilton and Troutman Sanders maintain a COVID-19 Dedicated Resource Center to help guide clients through the challenges presented by COVID-19.